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Self-knowledge and Depressive Symptoms in Late Adolescence: A Study Using the 
Repertory Grid Technique 
 
Abstract 
The goal of this study is to explore the relationship, suggested by recent 
developmental approaches, between several aspects of self-knowledge organization and 
depressive symptomatology in late adolescence, within the comprehensive framework of 
Kelly’s personal construct psychology. The repertory grid technique was used to obtain six 
measures of self-knowledge organization: global differentiation, polarization, presence of 
conflicts, and discrepancies between Actual Self, Ideal Self and Others. Two inventories were 
used to create two samples of late adolescents according to their level of depressive 
symptoms. Results supported the expectations of greater global differentiation and Actual-
Ideal Self discrepancy (or lower self-esteem) for adolescents with depressive symptoms, as 
well as a higher likelihood of intrapersonal conflicts. However, discrepancies between Self 
(Actual or Ideal), identification with, and perceived adequacy of, Others, and Polarization 
showed no significant differences. Furthermore, the association of symptom severity with 
different grid measures was stronger for adolescents with depressive symptoms. Results and 
limitations of this study are discussed, and the potential of using personal construct theory and 
the repertory grid technique in studies of self-knowledge and psychological adjustment during 
adolescence is explored.   
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The growing rates of depression found throughout adolescence (e.g., Hankin, 2015; 
Kovacs & Devlin, 1998) may be related to developmental changes in self-knowledge 
organization or structure (such as identity formation, self-concept differentiation, self-
discrepancies, etc.). Given the contradictory or inconsistent results produced by research in 
the field, some authors have emphasized the need for a more comprehensive understanding of 
a range of concepts and measures of self-knowledge organization and the importance of 
ascertaining their meaning and their relations with psychological adaptation (e.g., Campbell, 
Assanand & Paula, 2003; Pilarska & Suchańska, 2015; Schwartz, Klimstra, Luyckx, Hale III 
& Meeus, 2012). Others defend the need for structural measures of self-knowledge based on 
self-descriptions by the participants, rather than on the standardized lists most often provided 
by researchers (e.g., Campbell et al., 2003; Zhang, Xin & Lin, 2012).  
In this context, this study proposes to explore the relationship between self-knowledge 
organization and depression in late adolescence using Kelly’s (1955) Personal Construct 
Psychology (PCP) approach. Conceptually, PCP has proven to be fruitful in the understanding 
of personal change (e.g., Chiari, 2016; Kelly, 1955; Salmon, 1985) and psychological 
problems such as depression (Kelly, 1955; Neimeyer, 1984). In addition, the repertory grid 
technique (RGT), one of PCP’s most widely recognized assessment instruments, allows the 
measurement of a range of aspects of self-knowledge organization found in adolescence 
literature (such as self-differentiation, self-discrepancies, identity formation and 
individuation, self-esteem, internalization of self-standards, and intrapersonal conflicts), 
combining nomothetic and idiographic approaches to data analysis. Before introducing the 
PCP approach in more detail, we begin with a brief review of developmental perspectives of 
self-knowledge organization and its relation to internalized symptoms.  
Developmental Approaches to Self-knowledge Organization and Internalized Symptoms 
during Adolescence 
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Recent refinements of classical theories (Fischer & Bidell, 2006; Harter, 2012; Meeus, 
2011) and new theoretical frameworks (e.g., developmental psychopathology; Cicchetti & 
Toth, 2009) suggest that developmental gains in self-knowledge organization across 
adolescence allow a more complex view of self and others, and a more effective, flexible 
adaptation to sociocultural contexts. However, they also bring (at least transitory) liabilities 
(see Meeus, Iedema, Maassen & Engels, 2005; Moretti & Higgins, 1999; Noam, Paget, 
Valiant, Borst & Bartok, 1994). 
One example comes from the cognitive-developmental perspective (e.g., Damon & 
Hart, 1988; Fischer & Kennedy, 1997; Glick & Zigler, 1985; Harter, 2012; Oosterwegel & 
Oppenheimer, 1993), according to which adolescents become able to organize self-knowledge 
in abstract ways ((Fischer & Bidell, 2006; Inhelder & Piaget, 1958). Harter (2012) proposes 
that the differentiation of abstract self-attributes starts to increase in early adolescence and, by 
middle adolescence, new cognitive skills allow the detection of inconsistencies between these 
abstract self-descriptions, thus promoting the perception of conflict within the self and the 
subsequent experience of negative affect (Fischer & Kennedy, 1997; Harter & Monsour, 
1992). Provided that they have social support, some late adolescents can use integrative 
abstract skills to combine the seemingly contradictory self-attributes (“happy with close 
friend” and “annoyed with mother”) in higher order self-attributes (e.g., “adaptable”). 
However, only in adulthood are these cognitive skills available to most people in a more 
autonomous way (Fischer & Kennedy, 1997). Hence, transitory internalized symptoms may 
be an outcome of the organization of self-knowledge on its way towards a more elaborate and 
coherent self-system.  
Some findings also provide evidence of a relation between identity changes (Erikson, 
1968) and internalized symptoms. The exploration of alternative identities and low identity 
commitments is expected during adolescence, in the process of constructing an achieved 
6 
personal identity (Marcia, 1980). Nevertheless, studies of adolescents and college students 
have linked higher levels of internalized symptoms with the identity status of moratorium (or 
higher levels of exploration) and the lack of commitments for a prolonged period of time 
(Kunnen, Sappa, van Geert & Bonica, 2008; Luyckx, Schwartz, Goossens, Soenens & Beyers, 
2008; Meeus, 2011; Schwartz et al., 2010). In addition, there is evidence that better 
psychological adjustment becomes increasingly associated with strong identity commitments 
in late adolescence (e.g., Meeus et al., 2005). Furthermore, the identity status of foreclosure 
(which excludes previous significant exploratory activity) has been shown to be as healthy an 
“endpoint” in identity development as achievement (see Meeus, 2011). So, continued attempts 
at identity exploration may comprise a liability side, at least in later stages of adolescence, 
when commitments are needed to achieve well-being.   
The process of “internalization of self-standards” has also been associated with 
psychological maladjustment in adolescence, as self-standards (the “ideal self”, for instance) 
and role models provided by significant others progressively give way to adolescents’ own 
standards (Moretti & Higgins, 1999; Zentner & Renaud, 2007). Accordingly, several studies 
have reported that, during adolescence, the “ideal self” becomes increasingly distant from the 
self-perceived “actual self”, from how others are perceived, and from the perceived “ideal 
self” that others have about the adolescent (Glick & Zigler, 1985; Hankin, Roberts & Gotlieb, 
1997; Oosterwegel & Oppenheimer, 1993; Pinquart, Silbereisen & Wiesner, 2004; Strachan 
& Jones, 1982; Zentner & Renaud, 2007).  
It is possible that these ambitious internalized self-guides play a very positive 
developmental role during adolescence in that they entail increased autonomy and provide 
guidance and motivation to pursue self-exploration and personal change (Makros & McCabe, 
2001; Markus & Nurius, 1986; Moretti & Higgins, 1999). However, some research shows that 
large distances between Actual and Ideal-selves can contribute to lower personal satisfaction 
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with the self, or self-esteem (Harter, 2012; Pinquart et al., 2004), and promote depressive-like 
symptoms (Hammond & Romney, 1995; Hankin et al, 1997; Higgins, 1987; Papadakis, 
Prince, Jones & Strauman, 2006). This applies especially to older adolescents (Ferguson, 
Hafen & Laursen, 2010). As Pinquart et al. (2004) found, the process of heightening an Ideal 
may be associated with lower self-esteem in older adolescents, because they set standards that 
are more difficult to accomplish in a reasonable amount of time (e. g., identity-related tasks 
can be more demanding than the task of making new friends). In addition, as Harter (2012) 
maintains, adolescents become less aware of the social origin of their standards, and older 
adolescents may grow less certain of their personal judgements.  
In sum, several developmental gains emerge in middle to late adolescence concerning 
self-knowledge organization (self-differentiations, self-exploration for identity formation, 
individuation processes, internalization of self-standards, etc.) which have been associated 
with the increase in depressive-like symptoms throughout adolescence (which only decrease 
during adulthood) (e. g., Cicchetti & Toth, 2009; Galambos, Barker & Krahn, 2006; Hankin 
& Abramson, 2001; Hankin et al., 1998; Harter, 2012). However, studies seldom consider a 
range of self-organization aspects (or, if they include them, they rely on different 
measurement instruments), thus hindering a comprehensive understanding of how they 
contribute to adaptation during adolescence (e.g., Campbell et al., 2003; Pilarska & 
Suchańska, 2015). What is more, variables such as intrapersonal conflicts, which many 
theories regard as central, have been considered in only a few empirical studies (e.g., Harter & 
Monsour, 1982; Oosterwegel & Oppenheimer, 1993).  
Personal Construct Psychology, Self-knowledge and Psychological Adaptation 
According to Kelly (1955; for a comprehensive review, Walker & Winter, 2007; 
Winter & Reed, 2016), people, like scientists, construct hypotheses about objects, other 
persons, and events that are relevant to their adaptation and survival, and test them against 
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experience. Applying this perspective, self-knowledge is seen as a system of bipolar 
constructs (or dimensions of meaning) based on perceived similarities and differences 
between self and others and between others (Jackson & Bannister, 1985). Thus, according to 
PCP, knowledge about the self is entangled with knowledge about others, as recent 
approaches also propose (see, for instance, Chen, Boucher & Kraus, 2011; Denny, Kober, 
Wager & Ochsner, 2012). 
Adaptive change is a main theoretical concern of PCP (see Chiari, 2016; Salmon, 
1985), since it proposes that personal construct systems improve their ability to adequately 
anticipate events and guide a person in life. Pursuing this quest, self-knowledge, as a self-
organizing system, evolves in the direction of increasing differentiation and hierarchical 
integration. Moreover, construct systems are conceived as being in constant motion. Kelly 
referred to the cyclic nature of construing to describe the continuous flow of psychological 
activity, as reflected in the cycle of experience. At each moment in their experience, people 
confront events; constructs are validated or, if not, their construct system is revised. This 
cyclic nature also includes the alternating use, in balanced ways, of construing processes –  
such as dilation vs. constriction of the perceptual field, or loosening vs. tightening the ties 
between constructs and the assignment of constructs to elements as people try to make sense 
of daily events.  
The experience we call emotions is also considered to be an integral part of the cycle 
of experience. In general, agreeable emotions (e. g., love, pride, self-confidence) are 
experienced when events validate the adequacy of the self-system or a part of it, and a 
negative emotional tone (e. g., anxiety, anger, sadness) may emerge when the facing of events 
makes evident the inadequacy of the self-system and signals a need for change (Butler & 
Green, 2007; Kelly, 1955; for a review, Lester, 2009). So, emotions are considered a part of a 
healthy life and indispensable for development and change. In addition, psychological 
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disorders are perceived as reflecting an imbalance in the process of construing (Winter, 2003). 
In particular, the construing of depressed people has been described as more constricted, less 
differentiated, and more polarized; showing a negative bias, a fatalistic view of the future; and 
a perception of the self as isolated from others (e.g., Feixas, Erazo-Caicedo, Harter & Bach, 
2008; Kelly, 1955; Neimeyer, 1984; Sanz, 1992).  
----------------------------------- (Insert Figure 1 about here) ------------------------------------ 
A related contribution of Kelly’s work is the repertory grid technique (RGT), a 
procedure designed for the assessment of the structure of personal construct systems (for a 
description of the technique in its current form see Feixas & Cornejo, 2002; Fransella, Bell & 
Bannister, 2004). Compared to more traditional instruments, the RGT has the advantage of 
providing idiographic self-knowledge (both content and structure) and, at the same time, 
quantitative measures with already studied psychometrical properties (see Fransella et al., 
2004).  
Overall, Kelly’s approach offers a promising, comprehensive framework, both 
theoretical and methodological, for the analysis of a range of psychological constructs 
concerning the organization of self-knowledge during adolescence (e. g., global 
differentiation; discrepancies between Actual Self, Ideal Self and Others, or self-esteem, 
individuation, identification and identity formation, internalization of self-standards; 
intrapersonal conflicts, etc.) and its relation with depression (e.g., Hammond & Romney, 
1995; Jablonski & Lester, 2008; Jackson & Bannister, 1985; Oosterwegel & Oppenheimer, 
1993; Strachan & Jones, 1982). Moreover, the RGT allows the identification of internal 
conflicts (Feixas, Saúl & Ávila-Espada, 2009), a variable that is seldom present in empirical 
research. 
The Present Study 
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The aim of this study is to explore the relations between diverse aspects of self-
knowledge organization and depressive symptoms in late adolescence, considering the 
predictions from developmental perspectives explained above and the PCP’s conceptual 
devices (such as the entanglement of knowledge about the self and about significant others, or 
the transitions in the self-system and emotional experience) and methodological devices (such 
as a set of structural measures derived from the RGT).  
 The study’s general developmental hypothesis is that organization of self-knowledge 
will differ in adolescents with or without depressive symptomatology, in so far as those with 
higher depressive levels would show a developmentally more sophisticated organization of 
self-knowledge. In particular, adolescents with depressive symptoms are expected to show a 
globally more differentiated self-knowledge and larger mean discrepancies between Actual 
and Ideal selves (or lower self-esteem), Actual self and Others (or lower identification with 
others) and Ideal self and Others (a more negative view of others, or a more isolated ideal 
self). The adolescents with depressive symptoms are also expected to show lower polarization 
and a greater likelihood of intrapersonal conflicts. A complementary hypothesis proposes that 
there will be stronger relationships between measures of self-structure and symptoms in the 
sample with high levels of depression than in the sample without symptoms.  
Method 
Participants 
Participants were selected from a larger sample (N = 357) of 12th grade students in 
three secondary schools in a town in southern Portugal, who presented statistically extreme 
scores on a depressive symptoms inventory. Thirty-five adolescents participated in the final 
sample: 19 (2 boys and 17 girls, Mage = 17.6, SD = 1.01) comprised the Depression group (D), 
and 16 (9 boys and 7 girls, Mage = 17.3, SD = 1.14) the No-Symptoms group (NS).  
Instruments  
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 Children’s Depression Inventory (CDI). The CDI (Kovacs, 1992; Portuguese 
version by Marujo, 1994) comprises 27 items concerning a diversity of symptoms related to 
depression. This Portuguese version includes four options for assessing symptom severity, 
from 0 (absence of symptom) to 3 (greatest severity). The adaptation study in Portuguese 
children and adolescents (community samples) showed Cronbach alpha values of .83 and .90 
(Marujo, 1994).  
 Brief Symptom Inventory (BSI). The BSI (Derogatis, 1982; Portuguese version by 
Canavarro, 1999a) has 53 items which are rated from 0 (not at all) to 4 (extreme), providing 
measures of nine dimensions of psychopathology: somatization (S), obsession-compulsion 
(OC), interpersonal sensitivity (IS), depression (Dp), anxiety (A), hostility (H), phobic anxiety 
(PA), paranoid ideation (PI), and psychoticism (Ps). A global measure was also considered, 
the Positive Symptom Distress Index (PSDI): above the cut-off point of 1.7, this measure is 
considered to signal a high probability of emotional distress (Canavarro, 1999b). This version 
has shown adequate psychometric properties including internal consistency, with Cronbach 
alphas ranging from .62 (Ps) to .80 (S).  
Repertory Grid Technique (RGT). Each adolescent filled in a repertory grid of 15 
elements × 12 constructs, in a structured group procedure similar to an interview. First, the 
participants identified a sample of significant others (Father, Mother, Brother or Sister/the 
closest in age, Friend/same gender, Friend/other gender, Boyfriend/Girlfriend/romantic 
interest, Liked Person, Disliked Person) and self (Actual, Self as perceived by father, Self as 
perceived by mother, Self as perceived by best friend, Ought Self, Probable Self/one year 
later, and Ideal Self) elements. Second, bipolar constructs (e.g., responsible vs. irresponsible) 
were elicited using the dyadic method: participants were asked to compare a pair of elements 
(e.g., Actual Self and Father) looking for similarities (e.g. “which characteristics do these two 
people have in common?”, then asking for the opposite of that characteristic) and then for 
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differences (e.g., “and in which characteristics are they different?”). Finally, a 7-point Likert 
scale was used to score each element in each construct: scores of 1-very much so, 2-quite a 
lot, and 3-a little, applied to the first pole of the construct (e.g., responsible); scores of 5-a 
little, 6-quite a lot, and 7-very much so, applied to the other pole (e.g., irresponsible); the 4-
middle point was used only when a participant was unable to rate an element on either 
construct pole. Six structural measures were computed from each individual data matrix, 
which are described below (for details on the psychometric properties of the repertory grid 
and its measures, see Feixas, Bach & Laso, 2004; Feixas & Cornejo, 2002; Fransella et al., 
2004; Neimeyer & Feixas, 1992; Winter, 1992). 
Percentage of variance accounted for by the first factor (PVFF). This measure of 
global differentiation (see Feixas et al., 2004) quantifies the most important dimension of 
meaning, following a principal components analysis of each individual grid. Lower values 
have been interpreted as indicating higher differentiation (i.e., a multidimensional 
interpretation of self and others), and higher values as indicating one-dimensional construing.  
Polarization (P). This measure computes the percentage of extreme scores (1 and 7) in 
the grid: it is a measure of “all or nothing” thinking (Feixas et al., 2004).  
----------------------------------- (Insert Figure 1 about here) ------------------------------------ 
Presence of implicative dilemmas (ID). An implicative dilemma is a cognitive 
conflict about personal change; its presence in a repertory grid is identified by a correlation 
(of at least .35) between a congruent construct (Actual and Ideal selves perceived as similar, 
score difference no higher than 1 point) and a discrepant construct (Actual and Ideal selves 
perceived as different, score difference higher than 3 points) (Feixas et al., 2009). This 
correlation between a congruent and a discrepant construct is considered indicative of a 
conflictive structure when the desired change expressed by the discrepant construct is 
associated with the undesired pole of the congruent construct. In the example in Figure 1, an 
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adolescent saw himself as “introverted” but wished to become “extroverted” (as indicated by 
the position of the Ideal self). He also considered himself as “sensitive”; in this regard  he 
conformed to his “ideal self”, and therefore becoming “insensitive” would invalidate a self-
perceived positive attribute. The dilemma appears when, as inferred from the correlations 
among the construct scores, the change in the direction of becoming extroverted is linked, in 
his construct system, to becoming more insensitive – an undesirable goal. In this study the 
dichotomous variable presence or absence of IDs was considered. 
Recently, it has been found that IDs are more often present in adults diagnosed with 
depressive disorders and other clinical conditions (Montesano, López-González, Saúl & 
Feixas, 2015), and that people with IDs showed higher severity of depressive and anxiety 
symptoms in a community sample (Saúl, López-González, Feixas, Rubio-Garay & 
Domínguez-Simón 2014). Furthermore, despite the higher incidence in clinical samples (in 
different studies, 52% to 70% of subjects showed at least one dilemma), the presence of IDs 
in nonclinical samples was quite high (34% to 39%) (Feixas et al., 2009; Feixas et al., 2014a; 
Feixas, Montesano, Erazo-Caicedo, Compañ & Pucurull, 2014b; Montesano et al., 2014; Saúl 
et al., 2014). A recent study (Carapeto & Feixas, 2017) found that IDs were more likely in 
late adolescents (60%) than adults, in girls than boys (68% vs. 42%), and in late than early 
adolescents (60 vs. 39%). No data are available for depressed adolescents in this measure. 
Discrepancies between Actual Self, Ideal Self and Others (A-I, A-O, and I-O). By 
computing mean Euclidian distances between the scores of the Actual Self (A), Ideal Self (I) 
and Others (O) (Father, Mother, Brother/Sister, Friend/same gender, Friend/other gender, 
Boyfriend/Girlfriend, Liked Person, and Disliked Person) three self-discrepancy measures 
were obtained: A-I, A-O, and I-O. These can be considered measures of cognitive 
differentiation (Glick & Zigler, 1985; Oosterwegel & Oppenheimer, 1993), such that the 
greater the distance, the greater the differentiation. Also, the A-I is considered a self-esteem 
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measure (Feixas et al., 2008; Wang & Ollendick, 2001), such that the greater the distance, the 
lower the self-esteem.  
The A-O discrepancy has been used as a measure of identification with others, along a 
continuum from self-perception of social isolation of the self (greater distance) to 
identification with others (lesser distance) (Feixas et al., 2008; Strachan & Jones, 1982).  
Finally, the I-O has been conceived as a measure of the perceived adequacy of Others, 
going from a favorable perception (lesser distance) to a perception of Others’ inadequacy 
(greater distance) (Feixas et al., 2008). It has also been used as a measure of how much the 
Ideal is inspired (lesser distance) or isolated (greater distance) from Others (Strachan & Jones, 
1982).  
Procedures 
After obtaining informed consent from the schools’ Principals, adolescents, and their 
parents, the first of the two phases of data collection began. During this first phase, two 
inventories of symptoms were administered to 357 12th graders during class time. Statistically 
extreme scores on the CDI were then used to identify the adolescents for the final D and NS 
samples. Fifty-nine participants with minimum scores of one standard deviation above the 
mean (>25.40 + 7.15) were selected for the D sample, and 52 participants with maximum 
scores of one standard deviation below the mean (<25.40 - 7.15) and a PSDI lower than 1.7 
(one case excluded) made up the NS sample. The adolescents selected were asked by phone to 
participate in the second phase of data collection, and 35 agreed. At the end, the D final 
sample scored significantly higher on all symptom measures (Table 1). The second phase of 
data collection was carried out some days later and consisted in the administration of the RGT 
to small groups of up to eight adolescents, in a school classroom outside class time.  
Two computer programs were used to analyse the data: the GRIDCOR, version 4.0 
(Feixas & Cornejo, 2002) and the IBM SPSS 21. The first program was designed to analyse 
15 
grid data and was used to compute the self-knowledge structural measures from each 
repertory grid.  
The use of the SPSS for the statistical analysis highlighted the differences between D 
and NS adolescents in the measures of self-knowledge organization. Since samples were 
small, we followed the strategy suggested by Fife-Schaw (2006): parametrical tests and their 
equivalent non-parametrical tests were performed and, as both led to the same conclusions 
regarding statistical inference, the results of the parametrical tests were used. First, a 
multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was performed to check the general hypothesis 
that, overall, D and NS organize self-knowledge differently. All five quantitative measures 
were entered as dependent variables and gave rise to the composite variable “structure of self-
knowledge”. One factor was considered: the Group (in two categories, D and NS). Because a 
difference was found between the two samples in the composite variable of “structure of self-
knowledge”, a series of analyses of variance (ANOVA) were computed to assess the effect of 
Group on each quantitative measure. For IDs, a statistical analysis for categorical variables 
was carried out. A logistic regression was also performed to explore the relative effectiveness 
of each structural measure to predict whether an adolescent would belong to one or other 
group (D or NS). Correlations between self-organization measures (point-biserial correlations, 
for ID) and symptom severity were computed for each sample.   
------------------------------------------ (Insert Table 1 about here) ------------------------------------- 
Results 
 Statistically significant results from the MANOVA indicated that D and NS had 
different self-knowledge structures, F(5, 29) = 5.2, p = .002; η²p = .475, and the follow-up 
ANOVA tests suggested that the groups were similar with regard to P, A-O and I-O (Table 1). 
In addition, D showed lower PVFF (higher global differentiation) and higher A-I (lower self-
esteem) than NS. As for conflicts within the self, 74% of the adolescents in the D group 
16 
presented at least one ID compared with a significantly lower proportion (25%) in the NS 
group. 
A logistic regression was performed entering Group as dependent variable and all six 
self-organization measures as independent variables. The forward stepwise (likelihood ratio) 
method was used. The analysis was completed after performing the first step, and presence of 
IDs emerged as the only predictor, Wald = 7.490, df = 1, p = .006, Exp (B) = 8.400. 
Accordingly, IDs were able to correctly classify 74.3% of the 35 adolescents into their D or 
NS group. This model incorporating IDs fits the data better than a model without predictors 
(Omnibus test of model coefficients, χ² (1, 35) = 8.596, p = .003) and explains 29.1% of 
variance in the dependent variable (Nagelkerke’s R² = 0.291). 
----------------------------------- (Insert Table 2 about here) ------------------------------------- 
The complementary analysis of the correlations between self-knowledge organization 
measures and symptom severity is presented separately for the D and NS samples in Table 2. 
Overall, only P and I-O (with similar mean values for both D and NS) did not correlate with 
the severity of symptoms, and, among symptom measures, only PA did not correlate with any 
self-knowledge measure. In the D group, more correlations reached statistical significance (12 
out of 55) than in the NS group (two).  
The A-O means were similar for both samples, but varied in the D sample according to 
severity of symptoms. In the D sample as well, but not in the NS sample, the presence of ID 
correlated with severity of symptoms, OC and PI. 
In the NS group, the isolated associations of the PVFF and PSDI and CDI were 
salient: higher symptom severity and higher global differentiation went together. In depressed 
adolescents, this self-knowledge measure was associated with H only (i.e., the greater the 
differentiation, the greater the hostility symptoms). 
Discussion 
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 The results support our general hypothesis that late adolescents with and without 
depressive symptomatology organize self-knowledge differently, and that there are links 
between self-knowledge organization and internalized maladjustment in this stage of life, 
especially in adolescents with depression. In particular, compared to adolescents without 
symptoms, those with depressive symptoms showed higher global self-knowledge 
differentiation (lower PVFF), higher A-I (or lower self-esteem), and presented implicative 
dilemmas more frequently. The effect sizes reported should encourage further research to 
confirm or extend on the present analysis. Among all the self-structure variables studied, 
some evidence was found of the singular role of the presence of IDs in predicting adolescents’ 
belonging to one or other sample. However, some of our hypotheses were not supported, 
since no significant differences were found in self-differentiation from others (both A-O, or 
identification, and I-O, or Ideal inspired by others or perceived adequacy of others) or in P 
(although the differences were in the expected direction).    
The higher global differentiation in construing self and others found for the depressive 
adolescent sample is consistent with the cognitive-developmental perspective (e.g., Fischer & 
Kennedy, 1997; Harter, 2012), and with recent research on self-complexity (e.g., Cohen, 
Spiegler, Young, Hankin & Abela, 2013), as well as with recent results in the PCP field (e.g., 
Feixas et al., 2008). But this finding is at odds with the theory and with reports associating 
higher self-knowledge differentiation with better adjustment (e.g., Evans, 1994; Kelly, 1955; 
Linville, 1987; Neimeyer, 1984). The higher global differentiation of adolescents with 
depressive symptoms indicates that they have more dimensions of meaning with which to 
interpret themselves and others, which seems to be a developmental, adaptive advance. 
However, it is possible that high global self-differentiation may, at this stage, be a fertile 
ground for the emergence of inconsistencies among so much differentiated self-knowledge (or 
intrapersonal conflict, an issue to be analysed below), and internalized, depressive-like 
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symptoms as well (e.g., Harter, 2012). This notion is also supported by the results of the 
adolescents without symptoms, in whom higher global differentiation was associated with 
more severe depressive symptoms. If so, as soon as adolescents can use integrative skills to 
organize a more coherent self-picture, they may be freed from this maladjustment. This issue 
deserves further assessment in longitudinal studies. 
The results also challenge the classic stress-buffering hypothesis of higher self-
differentiation (Linville, 1987), but are compatible with more recent findings and ideas in the 
field of self-complexity (e.g., Brown & Rafaaeli, 2007; Cohen et al., 2013). For instance, 
Cohen et al. (2013) found that in the absence of identified stressors, higher self-complexity 
(or at least some of its components) may be related to depression. The moderating role of self-
differentiation in face of stressors is an issue that should be explored in further studies, as we 
did not collect data about possible stressful events. However, other research (see, for instance, 
Hankin & Abramson, 2001) has shown that adolescents with high scores on depression also 
reported a higher amount of stressful events. It is possible that the depressed adolescents 
dynamically increased self-knowledge differentiation so as to buffer the negative impact of 
those possible events (e.g., Brown & Rafaeli, 2007; Cohen et al., 2013; Showers & Zeigler-
Hill, 2003). The null correlation between PVFF and CDI found for the D group (together with 
the correlation found for the NS groups) offers some support to this proposal: once a certain 
high level of differentiation was attained, a buffer effect was noticed and the severity of 
depression no longer increased. 
At first glance, this result contradicts the PCP hypothesis that depressed people show a 
more constricted, less differentiated self-system (e.g., Kelly, 1955; Neimeyer, 1984). 
Actually, the research carried out until now, mainly in adult samples, has not reached a 
consensus on this issue, suggesting that the relationship between depression and self-
knowledge differentiation may not be a linear one (e.g., Feixas et al., 2008; Sanz, 1992). As 
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suggested by Sanz (1992), it is possible that the organization of self-knowledge evolves over 
the course of depressive trajectories, beginning with an increase in self-differentiation in the 
initial stages (or sub-clinical levels), and progressively moving towards a more one-
dimensional construing as individuals move into more severe depression. This explanation 
seems to be particularly apposite during middle to late adolescence, a period when the 
emergence of depression is relatively frequent (e.g., Hankin et al, 1998).  
An additional explanation emerges when considering this possible developmental 
trajectory of depression in the broader context of adolescent development (Coleman, 2011). 
Kelly (1955) defined two different dimensions of construing in transitions: loosening vs. 
tightening, and dilation vs. constriction. Higher global differentiation could mean more 
dilated and/or more loosened construing. Dilation could be perceived as a first step towards a 
necessary hierarchical integration, by allowing adolescents to expand their perceptual field 
and to try to consider simultaneously a larger number of elements from their personal and 
interpersonal world. Loosening may offer an opportunity to construct new meanings for the 
numerous new contexts in adolescent life, by weakening the ties between constructs and the 
previous assignment of these constructs to personal and interpersonal elements. In this 
context, depressive symptoms could signal a need for balance (Winter, 2003), the need to 
form high order constructs inspired by a diversity of elements and to reduce dilation, and/or to 
tighten construing to test new meanings against reality and thus complete the creativity cycle.  
Possibly, late adolescents with depression have difficulty in self-regulating this balance.  In 
the end, a high level of differentiation may be experienced as fragmentation (Cohen et al., 
2013; Feixas et al, 2009; Kelly, 1955).  
The IDs proved to be the most powerful of our measures for distinguishing between 
depressed and non-symptomatic adolescents, as their presence was more frequent in the 
depressed group (74% vs. 25%). This result is in line with the developmental hypothesis 
20 
mentioned above (together with the global differentiation findings) and with recent studies in 
clinically depressed and non-clinical adults (Feixas et al., 2014a; Feixas, Montesano, Erazo-
Caicedo, Compañ & Pucurull, 2014; Montesano et al., 2014; Montesano, López-González, 
Saúl & Feixas, 2015; Saul et al., 2014). Yet, adolescents in the D sample were also more 
likely (and NS adolescents less likely) to present IDs than late adolescents from the general 
population (60% in Carapeto & Feixas, 2017).  
Correlational analysis showed that depressed adolescents with dilemmas reported 
more severe paranoid ideation and obsession-compulsion symptoms, the two BSI scales most 
closely related to cognitive conflict. These results mirror those of Harter and Monsour (1992), 
who also found no negative affect other than the feeling “mixed or confused” in adolescents 
reporting conflicts. It may be that, in adolescents with depressive symptoms, IDs combine 
with a ruminative style that has been described as a vulnerability factor for depression (e.g., 
Cox, Funasaki, Smith & Mezulis, 2012; Hankin & Abramson, 2001; Hilt & Pollak, 2013; 
Kuyken, Watkins, Holden & Cook, 2006; Papadakis et al., 2006). The presence of IDs may 
contribute to psychological malaise, encourage rumination, and, simultaneously, activate a 
personal effort to build a more coherent self-system. Adolescents without symptoms with IDs 
did not report higher severity of any symptoms, possibly because they were less aware of 
these conflictive structures or because they were less prone to rumination. So it is possible 
that IDs contribute to depression.  
The possible role of IDs in promoting or blocking personal change at a developmental 
stage like adolescence in which numerous changes are expected (e.g., Coleman, 2011), and 
their influence on depression trajectories merits further research. Indeed, in an adult 
community sample the presence of ID was associated with severe depressive and anxiety 
symptoms (Saúl, López-González, Feixas, Rubio-Garay, Domínguez-Simon, 2014), but not 
with those of a more cognitive kind found in the D sample, and IDs were also associated with 
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openness to experience (see Saúl et al., 2014). 
With regard to the self-discrepancies, the higher A-I found for depressed adolescents 
is consistent with previous studies with adolescents (e.g., Hammond & Romney, 1995; 
Hankin et al., 1997) and adults (e.g., Feixas et al, 2008). This result suggests that D 
adolescents may use more advanced skills concerning cognitive differentiation or the 
internalization of ideals (e.g., Glick & Zigler, 1985). Also, the more ambitious standards for 
personal change that they seemed to establish (Moretti & Higgins, 1999; Pinquart et al, 2004) 
were possibly more fantastical and hard to attain and, thus, possibly contributed to lower self-
esteem. As such, this high level of discrepancy can be experienced as internalized 
maladjustment (Ferguson et al., 2010; Higgins, 1987; Pinquart et al., 2004). This discrepancy 
emerges as a possible risk factor for present and future adjustment, as low self-esteem can 
favor a trajectory of depression into adulthood (e.g., Compas, Connor & Heiden, 1998; Orth, 
Robins & Roberts, 2008; Steiger, Fend & Allemand, 2015) and A-I may stabilize at the end of 
adolescence (Zentner & Renaud, 2007).  
Contrary to our hypotheses, no significant differences in the self-differentiation from 
others (both A-O and I-O) were found. In this respect, the results paralleled those of Feixas et 
al. (2008) in a sample of adults with adjustment disorder with depressive mood. It seems that 
both samples identified themselves with others and perceived the adequacy of others to a 
similar degree, and that significant others played a similar role as self-standards. However, the 
A-O was associated with the severity of depressive symptoms for the already depressed 
adolescents, for whom lower identification was associated with more severe symptoms; it is 
possible that adolescents obtain some degree of protection for depression when they can 
identify themselves with others.  
Finally, D and NS samples presented similar results for polarization. This is consistent 
with Hammond and Romney’s (1995) study and with some studies in adult samples (e.g., 
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Feixas et al, 2008; Sanz, 1992). Nevertheless, although the difference did not reach statistical 
significance, depressed adolescents had a lower level of polarization, as our developmental 
hypothesis predicted.  
Conclusions 
Among other methodological limitations the small size of our samples and the absence 
of a clinical comparison group recommend caution in drawing conclusions. In spite of these 
caveats this exploratory study presents some interesting insights. First, depressed late 
adolescents organize self-knowledge differently from their non-symptomatic peers. 
Furthermore, some aspects of the organization of self-knowledge are associated with 
adjustment, in particular in depressed adolescents. The possibility that a more sophisticated 
self-knowledge organization (though as yet not able to achieve optimal integration) 
contributes to the formation of conflictive structures and (transitory) depressive 
symptomatology among middle and late adolescents (e.g., Harter, 2012; Noam et al., 1994) 
received some support from our study. Because depressive experience and low self-esteem 
seem to be risk factors for several developmental outcomes including depressive trajectories 
to adulthood (e.g., Compas et al., 1998; Orth et al., 2008; Steiger et al., 2015), some practical 
implications of our study should be stressed. In particular, adolescents need to have 
appropriate social support (including clinical and psychological counselling) to help them in 
the tasks of reorganizing self-knowledge in more integrative ways (Fischer & Kennedy, 1997; 
Harter, 2012) and regulating actual/ideal self-discrepancies (Zentner & Renaud, 2007). The 
role of peers may have a limited (or even a deleterious) effect in these tasks, as some recent 
studies about co-rumination have suggested (Dirghangi et al., 2015; Stone, Hankin, Gibb & 
Abela, 2011). Additional research is needed to clarify the developmental trajectories of self-
knowledge organization, stressful events and psychological maladjustment throughout 
adolescence and adulthood, in particular by means of longitudinal studies that include clinical, 
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sub-clinical and normal samples. The present exploratory study reinforces the potential of 
reciprocal contributions from developmental approaches and PCP for reaching a more 
comprehensive understanding of the complexities of self-knowledge and its relation to 
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Table 1  
Measures of symptoms and measures of self-knowledge organization for the depression and 
no-symptom samples 
 
Measures Depression  M (SD) 
No Symptoms  
M (SD) 
F (1, 33) 
 p η²p 
Symptoms      
CDI 38.63 (4.91) 16.13 (1.54) 302.804 .000 .903 
PSDI 2.02 (.39) 1.35 (.15) 41.272 .000 .556 
S .76 (.63) .38 (.38) 4.290 .046 .115 
OC 1.54 (.58) .91 (.41) 13.591 .001 .292 
SI 1.79 (.73) .70 (.45) 26.686 .000 .447 
Dp 1.74 (.74) .38 (.29) 47.412 .000 .590 
A 1.34 (.84) .50 (.42) 13.021 .001 .283 
H 1.42 (.90) .69 (.43) 8.964 .005 .214 
PA .61 (.65) .18 (.29) 6.103 .019 .156 
IP 1.48 (.75) .93 (.58) 5.891 .021 .151 
Ps 1.51 (.94) .43 (.38) 18.399 .000 .358 
Self-organization      
PVFF 42.01 (8.55) 49.72 (8.35) 7.233 .011 .180 
P 26.01 (17.55) 32.35 (11.74) 1.517  .227 .044 
A-I  0.51 (0.25) 0.29 (0.28) 6.111  .019 .156 
A-O  0.46 (0.19) 0.40 (0.16) .787 .382 .023 
I-O  0.40 (0.14) 0.37 (0.13) .548 .464 .016 
N cases with ID 
(%)  14 (73.68) 4 (25) c² (1, N = 35) = 8.241 .004 φ = -.485 
 
M: Mean; SD: Standard deviation; CDI: Children Depression Inventory; DI; PSDI: Positive Symptoms Distress Index (BSI); 
S: Somatization; OC: Obsession-Compulsion; SI: Interpersonal Sensitivity; Dp: Depression; A: Anxiety; H: Hostility; PA: 
Phobic Anxiety; Paranoid Ideation (PI); Ps: Psychoticism. PVFF: Percentage of Variance accounted for by the First Factor; 
P: Polarization; ID: Presence of Implicative Dilemmas; A-I: Discrepancy between Actual and Ideal Selves; A-O: 






Table 2  
Correlations (Pearson) between self-knowledge organization measures and severity of 
symptoms, by sample (Depressive and No symptoms) 
 
Depressive   No symptoms  
PVFF P A-I A-O I-O ID  PVFF P A-I A-O I-O ID 
CDI .061 .25 .297 .484* .209 .129  -.731** .123 -.082 .257 .149 -.241 
PSDI -.268 .328 .321 .545* .396 .357  -.608* .138 .052 .109 -.086 .215 
S .022 .423 .477* .392 .225 .044  .163 -.319 .362 .116 -.323 .070 
OC -.150 .160 .564* .274 .176 .542*   -.195 .118 .186 .130 -.098 .075 
IS -.205 .330 .392 .548* .322 .423  .202 -.159 -.176 -.151 -.429 -.270 
Dp -.078 .455 .372 .662** .197 .250  .122 -.019 .292 .138 -.260 .172 
A  -.037 .433 .468* .571* .291 .294  .217 -.215 .356 .137 -.288 -.119 
H -.515* .014 .358 .075 .084 .310  .247 .005 .386 .202 -.063 -.190 
PA -.167 .167 .190 .356 .042 .349  .149 -.218 -.216 -.279 -.331 -.256 
PI -.329 .042 .384 .254 .044 .462*  .035 -.179 -.080 -.285 -.459 .281 
Ps -.077 .377 .259 .677** .229 .199  .174 -.072 -.231 -.200 -.408 .039 
 
M: Mean; SD: Standard deviation; CDI: Children Depression Inventory; DI; PSDI: Positive Symptoms Distress Index (BSI); 
S: Somatization; OC: Obsession-Compulsion; SI: Interpersonal Sensitivity; Dp: Depression; A: Anxiety; H: Hostility; PA: 
Phobic Anxiety; Paranoid Ideation (PI); Ps: Psychoticism. PVFF: Percentage of Variance accounted for by the First Factor; 
P: Polarization; ID: Presence of Implicative Dilemmas; A-I: Discrepancy between Actual and Ideal Selves; A-O: 
Discrepancy between Actual Self and Others; I-O: Discrepancy between Ideal Self and Others. 
*  Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).      







Figure 1. Illustration of the basic structure of an implicative dilemma found in the repertory 
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